

## Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 PEKING 1963

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RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT PASS HONG KONG, MOSCOW, TAIPEI AND TOKYO

E.O.11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, CH, US, OVIP (SCHLESINGER, JAMES)

REFS: A) PEKING 1776 B) PEKING 1948

1. BEGIN INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER AND FOUR MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION (PERLE, WHITSON, WEST AND BENOIT) MET FOR TWO HOURS AND FORTY MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 28 WITH PRC PERMIER AND PARTY FIRST VICE CHAIRMAN HUA KUO-FENG. THE CHINESE SIDE ALSO INCLUDED FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA, MFA AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR LIN PING, AND NANCY TANG (INTERPRETER). ACCORDING TO AN ORAL BRIEFING FROM NOTES BY ONE DELEGATION MEMBER (SUPPLEMENTED BY OBSERVATIONS FROM SCHLESINGER AND OTHERS), THE SESSION WAS DOMINATED BY AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON GLOBAL STRATEGY. FOLLOWING IN THE MAIN FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO'S STANDARD BRIEF (REF A), HUA SCORED SOVIET EXPANSIONISM, CONDEMNED THE "MUNICH MENTALITY," AND CALLED FOR A "POOLING OF EFFORTS" TO CONTAIN MOSCOW. THIS VIEW, HUA ADDED, HAD BEEN COMMUNICATED BY THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP TO PRESIDENT NIXON AND SECRETARY KISSINGER. HUA INDICATED CHINESE SATISFACTION AT PRESIDENT FORD'S DROPPING OF THE WORD "DETENTE"; HE CITED APPROVINGLY THE POLICIES EXEMPLIFIED AND PROMOTED BY THE WEST GERMAN CDU, FRENCH CHIEF OF STAFF MERY, THE "PRESENT GOVERNMENTS" OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, THE BRITISH OPPOSITION LEADER THATCHER; BUT HE

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SCATHINGLY DENOUNCED MIKI-MIYAZAWA POLICIES TOWARD THE SOVIET

UNION. HUA DID NOT RAISE SINO-US BILATERAL RELATIONS, NEVER MENTIONED TAIWAN, AND EVIDENCED NO CURIOSITY ABOUT THE US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. NO LIGHT WHATSOEVER WAS SHED ON THE PRC LEADERSHIP OR HUA'S ROLE WITHIN IT, THOUGH SCHLESINGER AND OTHERS WERE IMPRESSED BY HUA'S AURA OF COMMAND AND APPARENT INTELLIGENCE. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

2. THE INVITATION. HUA OPENED THE SESSION BY REVIEWING THE BACKGROUND OF THE CHINESE INVITATION TO DR. SCHLESINGER. THE NEW SINO-US RELATIONSHIP HAD BECOME POSSIBLE THROUGH THE "WISE DECISION OF CHAIRMAN MAO"; PRESIDENT NIXON, HUA ADDED, HAD "ALSO MADE HIS CONTRIBUTION." IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP EVOLVING "BY TWISTS AND TURNS," CHAIRMAN MAO HAD PERSONALLY DIRECTED IN 1974 THAT THEN-DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER BE INVITED TO VISIT CHINA. (SCHLESINGER SAYS THAT HE FIRST LEARNED OF THIS INVITATION FROM PRCSO CHIEF HUANG CHEN JUST BEFORE DEPARTING FOR CHINA. THROUGHOUT HIS TRIP CHINESE OFFICIALS ALLUDED OFTEN TO "CHAIRMAN MAO'S INVITATION.") WHEN SCHLESINGER LEFT OFFICE IN 1975, CHAIRMAN MAO INDICATED THAT THE INVITATION SHOULD REMAIN OPEN.

3. COOPERATION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. HUA EMPHASIZED THE INSATIABLE EXPANSIONIST APPETITE OF THE SOVIET UNION NOW MORE GREEDY THAN THE OLD TSARS WITHOUT CALLING FOR A FORMAL PACT OR SYSTEMATIC COOPERATION AMONG COUNTRIES OPPOSED TO SOVIET HEGEMONY, HUA IMPLICITLY ARGUED FOR AN ANTI-SOVIET FRONT INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES -- A "POOLING OF OUR EFFORTS TOGETHER AGAINST THE POLAR BEAR." WITH THIS IN MIND:

--THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP HAD PROPOSED TO PRESIDENT NIXON "A LINE" RUNNING THROUGH CHINA, JAPAN, PAKISTAN, IRAN, THE MIDDLE EAST, THE THIRD WORLD, WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES "TO RESIST SOVIET EXPANSIONISM."

--CHAIRMAN MAO HAD "TRIED TO PERSUADE DR. KISSINGER TO STAY IN JAPAN" AND "TO WORK WITH JAPAN." (HUA DID NOT SPECIFY THE TIME FRAME, BUT DELEGATION MEMBERS INFERRED THAT HE MEANT 1973.) WITH RESPECT TO JAPAN, HUA CONCLUDED, RELATIONS WITH SECRET

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THE UNITED STATES CAME FIRST AND WITH CHINA SECOND.

--CHINESE LEADERS HAD "URGED" SECRETARY KISSINGER TO "HELP" PAKISTAN "WHEN HE WAS HERE" -- BUT "HIS RECENT TRIP INDICATES THAT HE WAS UNSUCCESSFUL."

--THE CHINESE HAD "URGED" THE UNITED STATES "TO USE BOTH HANDS" IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BZD DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH ARAB COUNTRIES

WHILE MAINTAINING ITS TIES WITH ISREAL. HUA EMPHASIZED  
THAT THE CHINESE BELIEVED "COMPLETE" SUPPORT OF ISRAEL WOULD  
NOT BE IN AMERICAN INTERESTS.

THOUGH ALL OF THESE EVENTS WERE DESCRIBED IN THE PAST TENSE,  
HUA LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT CHINESE THINKING HAS NOT ALTERED,  
THAT THIS SORT OF INFORMAL ENTENTE TO CONTAIN SOVIET  
EXPANSIONISM IS THE CORRECT AND ONLY VIABLE INTERNATIONAL  
STRATEGY.

4. STATE OF THE WORLD. HUA DELIVERED A TOUR D'HORIZON FOCUSING  
ON THE STATE OF PLAY IN THE CONTEMPORARY ANTI-SOVIET STRUGGLE;  
HUA ADHERED CLOSELY TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO'S STANDARD BRIEF  
AND DIFFERED FROM PUBLIC CHINESE POSITIONS ONLY IN THE  
SOMETIMES ACIDUOUSLY CANDID DISCUSSION OF WORLD PERSONALITIES.

5. HUA DERIDED THE "SONNENFELDT DOCTRINE," CRITICIZE THE  
HELSINKI ACCORDS AND CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION  
IN EUROPE AS CREATING THE "FALSE IMPRESSION" THAT THERE  
EXISTS EUROPEAN SECURITY, AND CONDEMNED ALL AS EVIDENCE OF  
"MUNICH THINKING" -- A CAPITULATION TO THE SOVIET UNION  
WHICH IS "OUT TO FINLANDIZE" EUROPE. (TO THIS, DR. SCHLESINGER  
SUGGESTED THAT "POLANDIZE" MIGHT BE A MORE ACCURATE  
CHARACTERIZATION OF SOVIET INTENTIONS.) JUST AS IT WAS  
IMPORTANT TO CRITICIZE AND EXPOSE THE "MUNICH MENTALITY,"

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SO THE WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS SHOULD NOT BE "COMPLETELY RELIANT"  
ON THE US, FOR THIS WOULD SURELY ERODE THEIR SELF-CONFIDENCE.

6. HUA SPOKE CONTEMPTUOUSLY OF JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER MIKI'S POLICIES AND OBSERVED ACIDLY THAT FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA "WOULD HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF SURRENDER HAD HE BEEN A CHINESE LEADER." HUA MADE CLEAR THAT HE REFERRED TO THE MIKI-MIYAZAWA STANCE ON THE ANTI-HEGEMONY CLAUSE SPECIFICALLY AND TO JAPANESE POLICIES VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION MORE GENERALLY. ASKED BY DR. SCHLESINGER IF MIYAZAWA'S TOUR OF THE NORTHERN ISLANDS AREA DID NOT CONSTITUTE A HARDENED -- AND THEREFORE IMPROVED -- JAPANESE POSTURE, HUA REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE, TERMING THE INSPECTION "ONLY A SHOW." WITHOUT ELABORATING, HUA INDICATED THAT THE CHINESE FAVOR "DEVELOPMENT" OF THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCE.

7. ELSEWHERE HUA SAW ENCOURAGING GLOBAL TRENDS:

--PRESIDENT FORD PUBLICLY DROPPED THE WORD "DETENTE" FROM HIS VOCABULARY.

--SOVIET PLUMPING FOR AN AISAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM HAD HAD "NO EFFECT." MOREOVER, HUA EXTOLLED "THE PRESENT GOVERNMENTS" OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND FOR REMAINING "VIGILANT" AGAINST THE SOVIET THREAT.

-IN WEST GERMANY, OSTPOLITIK HAD GRADUALLY "FALLEN APART."  
HUA PRAISE THE CDU FOR ITS "LUCID" STANCE ON THE QUESTION  
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OF RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW.

-IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADER THATCHER HAD "PUT THE MATTER (OF POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIETS) FORWARD VERY ACUTELY."

--FRENCH CHIEF OF STAFF MERY HAD POINTED OUT DURING HIS JUNE VISIT TO CHINA THAT THE FRENCH DEFENSE EFFORT WAS INCREASING.

8. CHINESE SELF-RELIANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. HUA DELIVERED AN IMPASSIONED DEFENSE OF CHINESE SELF-RELIANCE ALONG FAMILIAR LINES: IMPERIALISTS HAD INFLICTED OPIUM UPON CHINA, CHINA WAS ALL-TOO-ACCURATELY CHARACTERIZED AS THE "SICK MAN OF ASIA," AND CHINESE SELF-CONFIDENCE WAS CONSEQUENTLY IMPAIRED. BUT FOLLOWING 27 YEARS OF "EARTHSHAKING CHANGES," THE CHINESE PEOPLE HAD SHED THEIR INFERIORITY COMPLEX AND BEGUN TO BELIEVE THAT THEY COULD ACHIEVE WHAT FOREIGN COUNTRIES HAD. YET CHINESE SELF-CONFIDENCE WAS STILL INCOMPLETE EVEN TODAY. FOR THIS REASON, AND BECAUSE THE POST-LIBERATION "YOUNGER GENERATION" COULD NOT WHOLLY COMPREHEND THE SITUATION EXISTING BEFORE 1949, THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP ATTACHED A HIGH PRIORITY TO EDUCATING THE MASSES CONSTANTLY IN THE MEANING OF "SELF-RELIANCE." THE CHINESE, HUA SAID, ARE

STRIVING "TO BUILD A MODERN CHINA BY THE END OF THE CENTURY." (DELEGATION MEMBERS AGREE THAT HUA DID NOT ADD THE WORD "SOCIALIST" HERE BEFORE CHINA AS IN THE STANDARD FORMULATION.) IN SO DOING, THE FOCAL POINT OF DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE THE SMALL TOWNS IN THE CHINESE INTERIOR, NOT THE DEVELOPED URBAN CENTERS.

9. IMPRESSIONS OF HUA. DR. SCHLESINGER AND HIS DELEGATION WERE FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY HUA. EXPECTING A RATHER UNSOPHISTICATED AND TENATIVE APPARATCHIK UNSCHOOLED IN THE INTRICACIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THEY DETECTED INTELLIGENCE, CONFIDENCE, AND AN AURA OF LEADERSHIP. CHINESE OFFICIALS PRESENT TREATED HUA WITH DEFERENCE AND RESPECT (THE PRECEDING DAY, DR. SCHLESINGER OBSERVED, SOME OF THE SAME OFFICIALS HAD REGARDED YEH CHIEN-YING WITH "VENERATION") (REF B). HUA HAD MASTERED HIS BRIEF, REFERRING RARELY TO THE TEXT BEFORE HIM BUT LOOKING TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO FOR OCCASIONAL GUIDANCE WHEN REQUIRED TO ADDRESS UNANTICIPATED  
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QUESTIONS.

10. HUA OFFERED NO COMMENT ON THE CHINESE INTERNAL SCENE, HIS OWN POSITION WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP, OR CHINESE PLANS FOR THE FORTHCOMING NATIONAL DAY.  
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## Message Attributes

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